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ABSTRACT 
 To mitigate threats to our nation, homeland security operators depend on the 
acquisition workforce in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop, field, 
and sustain the technologies that help them accomplish their mission. Instability in the 
acquisition workforce can delay readiness of those technologies, giving adversaries a 
distinct advantage. This study defines the acquisition workforce, establishes a benchmark 
for instability, and determines whether the DHS acquisition workforce is unstable. 
 The study uses data from DHS, industry, and other government sources to 
determine attrition rates and the primary causes leading to attrition during the last five 
years. Overlaying additional data, the study includes a comparative analysis and trend 
identification, and discusses staffing requirements, shortages, time to deliver an initial 
operational capability, and time to hire as critical contributors to instability. The results 
show that, based on the established benchmark, the acquisition workforce is stable; 
however, the same methodology applied at the component level shows that two DHS 
components are unstable. 
 Finally, the thesis presents simple recommendations, such as establishing career 
models for the acquisition workforce, as well as more complex ways forward, such as 
consolidating the acquisition workforce. 
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces a plethora of emerging threats 
from bad actors who wish to disrupt our American way of life. Frontline DHS operators 
depend on technology and information systems to accomplish their mission. Technologies 
must continually evolve to counter the emerging threats, which creates capability gaps. The 
DHS acquisition workforce is responsible for narrowing those gaps by developing, 
fielding, and sustaining technologies. Each year, DHS spends billions of dollars to develop 
technologies and information systems to fill capability gaps in its mission space. 
Unfortunately, as the Government Accountability Office reported, in March 2016 only 11 
of 25 DHS programs were on track to meet cost and schedule goals.1  
The problem is that DHS does not truly know if its acquisition workforce is stable. 
The acquisition workforce’s stability affects the department’s ability to develop and 
provide technology capabilities to mitigate threats. This study develops a framework and 
benchmark for instability within the acquisition workforce using two key data points: 
attrition and staffing requirements. The study also presents data that explains why 
employees leave the DHS acquisition workforce. 
DHS does not have the ability to determine which personnel directly support 
acquisition programs. This study assumes that certain job series support acquisition 
programs, including program managers, management and program analysts, engineers, 
contracting professionals, operations research analysts, and information technology 
specialists. This study focuses on DHS components with multiple ongoing, major 
acquisitions: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), United States Citizenship 
and Immigration Service (USCIS), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the United 
States Secret Service (USSS), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The 
__________________________ 
1 Government Accountability Office, DHS Has Strengthened Management, but Execution and 
Affordability Concerns Endure, GAO-16-338SP (Washington, DC: Government Accountability 
Office, March 2016), 2. 
xvi 
Headquarters and Science and Technology Directorates are also included within the scope 
of this research because of their support to major acquisition programs. 
Data for this study originated from multiple sources, including books, reports, 
journal articles, data sets obtained through the Office of Personnel Management’s online 
Management Cube, and a higher-fidelity data set obtained from the DHS Office of the 
Chief Human Capital Officer. The study uses Bureau of Labor Statistics information to 
compare government and industry data. The data, organized by component and fiscal year, 
was used to calculate attrition rates for each job series, year, and component, resulting in 
270 data points. The data are presented in tables and graphs, with discussion of trends 
between data sets. 
To determine instability, the study compares individual acquisition workforce 
attrition data points to the component’s average attrition rate. Acquisition workforce data 
points higher than the component’s average count toward instability. The researcher 
established a benchmark of stability as 70 percent of all data points being below or equal 
to the component’s average. At the department level, 82—or 30 percent of the 270 
available data points—were above the components’ combined annual attrition rate. While 
there is no standard or industry comparison to further define instability, the researcher feels 
that, based on available data, the DHS acquisition workforce is stable. However, DHS 
should further investigate potential instability in CBP and ICE; for these components, 60 
percent of the data points fall above the component, which indicates instability. 
The data show two primary reasons why employees leave the acquisition 
workforce: retirement and resignation. Employees tend to resign due to insufficient career 
growth, lack of respect, poor compensation, and unchallenging work. 
The study concludes by discussing the pros and cons of implementing five 
recommendations: establishing an acquisition research effort within DHS, developing 
career models for the acquisition workforce, conducting exit interviews, making a more 
robust effort to establish data-driven policy, and consolidating the DHS acquisition 
workforce. Implementing any or all of these recommendations could increase successful 
DHS acquisition programs. 
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According to the intelligence community’s 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment, the 
threat to the American homeland is broader and more dynamic than ever.1 Smaller terrorist 
cells have organized, the lone-wolf threat has expanded, and natural disasters coupled with 
response and recovery efforts continue to strain the nation. The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) provides material and information technology solutions to mitigate the 
threat. Through a rigorous process, the DHS acquisition community develops solutions to 
fill capability gaps identified by field operators.  
Each year, DHS spends billions of dollars to develop technologies and information 
systems to fill these capability gaps in its mission space. Unfortunately, as the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reported in March 2016, only 11 of 25 DHS programs were 
on track to meet cost and schedule goals.2 As the GAO reported, these programs’ failures 
and delays have resulted in schedule delays of 11 months on average, as well as Life-Cycle 
Cost Estimate (LCCE) increases totaling $1.7 billion across DHS.3 In a review of 71 major 
acquisition programs at DHS, a RAND report authored by Jeffrey A. Drezner and Andrew 
R. Morral highlights “three common root causes for cost growth and schedule delays.”4 
Sixty-eight of these programs encountered at least one of these root causes: 
• “poorly defined, unapproved shifting baseline performance requirements (43 
programs)”5 
                                                 
1 Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, 
DC: Director of National Intelligence, February 2018). 
2 Government Accountability Office (GAO), DHS Has Strengthened Management, but Execution and 
Affordability Concerns Endure, GAO-16-338SP (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
March 2016), 2. 
3 GAO, 13. 
4 Jeffrey A. Drezner and Andrew R. Morral, Reducing the Cost and Risk of Major Acquisitions at the 
Department of Homeland Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013). 
5 Drezner and Morral, 3. 
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• funding instabilities (61 programs)6 
• “an inadequate supply of trained and qualified acquisition workforce (51 
programs).”7 
Drezner and Morral point out factors that play into these root causes within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal agencies, as well as in private industry.8 
One common issue they highlight is “a lack of stability (high turnover) in both the 
government and contractor workforce.”9 Subsequently, a Congressional Research Service 
report found that “Chronic and systemic personnel shortfalls and lengthy hiring times 
jeopardize DHS’s homeland security mission and attrition rates are outpacing hiring in 
several components of the department.”10 Furthermore, a 2007 GAO report asserts that a 
“key challenge DHS has faced is effectively and strategically managing its sizable 
workforce of nearly 171,000 employees in order to respond to current and emerging 21st 
century challenges.”11 The 2007 report was titled DHS’s Actions to Recruit and Retain 
Staff and Comply with the Vacancies Reform Act; accordingly, recruitment and retention 
in the acquisition workforce is the focus of this study. 
In 2008, the National Defense Industrial Association analyzed the systemic root 
causes of program failures, coming to two key conclusions. The first conclusion focused 
on a lack of early acquisition and gate reviews. The second conclusion regarding program 
failures highlighted “staff size, training and experience.”12 The analysis also revealed, 
“Staffing shortfalls (numbers, skill, and experience) lead to adverse acquisition 
                                                 
6 Drezner and Morral. 
7 Drezner and Morral. 
8 Drezner and Morral. 
9 Drezner and Morral. 
10 William Painter and Barbara Schwemle, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY 
2016, CRS Report No. R44053 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016). 
11 Robert Goldenkoff, DHS’s Actions to Recruit and Retain Staff and Comply with the Vacancies 
Reform Act, GAO-07-758 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2007), 1. 
12 National Defense Industrial Association Systems Engineering Division (NDIA), Report on Systemic 
Root Cause Analysis of Program Failures (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008). 
3 
consequences specifically in the areas of requirements, planning, execution, and 
expectations.”13 The challenge of staff shortages within the acquisition community dates 
back to the Civil War; in his book Arming the Eagle, Wilbur Jones discusses the Ordnance 
Department, which dealt with personnel shortages and turnover throughout the war.14
From as far back as the Civil War to as recent as today, acquisition communities have had 
to manage challenging personnel issues and shortcomings to deliver enhanced capabilities. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The DHS acquisition community, like every workforce, faces challenges associated 
with attrition. Attrition, as defined by Daniel Sonsino in HR Magazine, is the loss, 
retirement, or death of anyone within an organization’s workforce.15 Human resources 
practitioners agree: workforce attrition affects organizations, yet some aspects of 
attrition—such as death and retirement—are unavoidable. And not all attrition has a 
negative impact. For example, based on organizational needs, some natural attrition is 
welcome because it “right-sizes” the organization to meet lower demand in a particular 
field. Moreover, attrition of poorly performing employees is not a great loss, as it opens 
the door for new, productive, and potentially more cost-effective employees. 
The problem is that DHS does not truly know if its acquisition workforce is stable, 
which affects the department’s ability to develop and provide technology capabilities to 
mitigate threats. The hypothesis behind this research is that if there is instability in the 
acquisition workforce, then acquisition programs are more likely to fail. With this 
hypothesis in mind, this thesis sought to answer the primary research question: Is there 
instability in the DHS acquisition workforce? Two sub-questions included: What is the 
attrition rate of the acquisition workforce at DHS? and What are the primary factors 
contributing to attrition of the acquisition workforce? 
13 NDIA, 13. 
14 Wilber D. Jones, Jr., Arming the Eagle (Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management College, 
1999), 101. 
15 Daniel Sonsino, “Viewpoint: Does Attrition Still Matter?,” HR Magazine, October 2017, 
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/1017/Pages/does-attrition-still-matter.aspx. 
4 
B. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
With nearly half of all acquisition programs at DHS experiencing cost, 
performance, or schedule challenges, any efforts to identify and correct shortcomings 
related to acquisition outcomes must be welcomed by the acquisition community.16 Two 
key facts emphasize the significance of this study. First, no business―whether private, 
commercial, or government―can deny that its workforce is the most important tangible 
resource for ensuring success. Therefore, the department should see a robust effort to 
analyze attrition data and understand its impacts on program success. Second, financial 
expenditures on failed programs are overwhelming. While recommendations identified in 
this study may take years to implement or mature into measureable utility, the American 
taxpayer will benefit. 
According to the GAO, DHS has historically not delivered successful acquisition 
programs.17 Any research that leads to recommendations for improving acquisition 
outcomes at DHS is certain to draw attention from its executive leadership. Additionally, 
while attrition has been studied and is currently monitored by DHS, there has never been a 
clear effort to specifically look at attrition within the acquisition community, or to 
determine its potential drivers. This study thus provides an academic review of attrition 
within the DHS acquisition workforce and recommends actions the department can take to 
improve its long-term stability.  
Using open-source and DHS-produced data, the study determines attrition rates of 
job series that support DHS’s acquisition functions, and develops a methodology to 
determine instability. The data are also used to identify trends and primary causes of 
attrition within the DHS acquisition workforce, and to determine if this community’s 
attrition rate is similar other organizations. Ultimately, the results of this research may help 
DHS understand how human capital within the acquisition community is managed and 
whether or not there is room for improvement.  
                                                 
16 GAO, Earlier Requirements Definition and Clear Documentation of Key Decisions Could Facilitate 
Ongoing Progress, GAO-17-346SP (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017), 2. 
17 GAO, Major Program Assessments Reveal Actions Needed to Improve Accountability, GAO-15-
171SP (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2015), 2. 
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C. LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE 
Organized around a cohort of professionals from the homeland security enterprise, 
the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security Studies 
master’s program is 18 months in duration. As a result, this study was time-boxed with a 
fixed completion date; therefore, time was a severe limitation of this study. The time 
limitation resulted in a top-level review of attrition data rather than a detailed deep dive 
and discussion with DHS component human resources offices.  
Furthermore, this study does not address or account for any contributions or data 
associated with the contracted workforce supporting DHS acquisitions. Drezner and 
Morral address contractor and government turnover in their RAND report; currently, DHS 
does not track pertinent data about the number of contractors supporting acquisition 
programs.18 The value of the contracted workforce at DHS cannot be understated, as it 
brings skills and years of experience to support program managers across the enterprise. 
The expertise and experience they bring to the acquisition community is critical to 
accomplishing the acquisition workforce mission. Due to the lack of data, however, they 
are not covered in this study. 
In 2002, the Homeland Security Act established DHS by combining 22 separate 
agencies.19 For the purposes of determining instability, this study only focuses on the 
major components that have multiple, ongoing acquisition programs, including Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Service (USCIS), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the United States Secret Service 
(USSS), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Two directorates, the 
Headquarters and Science and Technology (S&T) Directorates, are also included within 
the scope of this research because of their support to major acquisition programs.  
                                                 
18 Drezner and Morral, Reducing Cost and Risk. 
19 “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security,” Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
September 24, 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security. 
6 
The S&T Directorate is the research and development arm of DHS, responsible for 
developing technologies for the department’s components to counter a plethora of threats. 
The S&T team tasked most heavily with supporting major acquisition programs is the 
Capability Development Support Group, which comprises three offices: the Office of 
Systems Engineering, the Office of Operations and Requirements Analysis, and the Office 
of Test and Evaluation. The Office of Systems Engineering provides the expertise needed 
to “apply the scientific principles to practical ends; as the design, construction and 
operation of efficient and economical structures, equipment and systems.”20 For example, 
this office provides acquisition programs with a technical assessment that evaluates a 
number of key systems engineering factors within a technology development program. The 
Office of Operations and Requirements Analysis conducts detailed analyses in support of 
the components’ needs within acquisition programs. Finally, the Office of Test and 
Evaluation provides oversight and independently assesses the technologies that 
components are developing before they are fielded to the end user. 
The DHS acquisition community encompasses different skill sets and job series. 
This research only addresses the job series outlined in Table 1. 
  
                                                 
20 Alexander Kossiakoff et al., Systems Engineering Principles and Practice, 2nd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 3. 
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Table 1.   Occupational Job Series Covered by this Research21 
Job 
Series 
Series Title Description 
0340 Program Management  Manages or directs, or assists in a line capacity in 
managing or directing one or more programs 
0343 Management and 
Program Analysis 
Serves as an analyst and advisor to management. 
Evaluates the effectiveness of government 
programs and operations or the productivity and 
efficiency of the management of Federal 
agencies, or both. 
0800 Engineering  Advises on, administers, supervises, or performs 
professional, scientific, or technical work 
concerned with engineering or architectural 
projects, facilities, structures, systems, processes, 
equipment, devices, material or methods. 
1102 Contracting  Manages, supervises, performs, or develops 
policies and procedures for professional work 
involving the procurement of supplies, services, 
construction, or research and development using 
formal advertising or negotiation procedures; the 
evaluation of contract price proposals; and the 
administration or termination and close out of 
contracts. 
1515 Operations Research  Manages, supervises, leads, or performs scientific 
work that involves designing, developing, and 
adapting mathematical, statistical, econometric, 
and other scientific methods and techniques. 
2210 Information Technology 
Management  
Manages, supervises, leads, administers, 
develops, delivers, and supports information 
technology (IT) systems and services. 
 
  
                                                 
21 Adapted from Office of Personnel Management, Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families 
(Washington, DC: OPM, May 2009), 38, 39, 67, 84, 99, 120. 
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DHS categorizes its acquisition programs into three separate levels, based primarily on 
total life-cycle cost. Table 2 identifies the different levels of acquisition programs at DHS, 
with the cost thresholds for each. DHS currently cannot identify and track the actual 
number of personnel who directly support only major acquisition programs, identified as 
level 1 and level 2, according to DHS Acquisition Management Instruction 102–01-001.22 
Because there are no actual acquisition workforce staffing numbers, this study takes a 
broader look at the job series that would typically support the acquisition mission. 
Table 2.   DHS Acquisition Program Categories23 
Category Life-Cycle Cost of Program 
Major Level 1 ≥ $1B LCCE 
Major Level 2 ≥ $300M to ≤ $1B LCCE 
Nonmajor IT (Level 3) ≥ $50M to ≤ $300M LCCE 
Nonmajor IT (Level 3) < $50M 
Nonmajor non-IT (Level 3) < $300M 
 
D. BACKGROUND 
This section provides background on how DHS spends its money and provides 
clarity on the difference between acquisition and procurement. With such a large 
percentage of the DHS budget going to the purchasing of goods and services, any instability 
in its workforce will be a threat to success and could lead to increased cost for the 
department. 
According to the Cato Institute, DHS spent 34 percent of its budget in 2017 on 
purchases.24 Figure 1 shows a combination of both acquisition programs and procurements 
funded by DHS.  
                                                 
22 DHS, Acquisition Management Instruction, 102-01-001, Rev 01 (Washington, DC: DHS, 2016), 31. 
23 Adapted from DHS, Acquisition Management Instruction, 31. 
24 Chris Edwards, “Department of Homeland Security,” Downsizing the Federal Government, July 12, 
2017, https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/homeland-security. 
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Figure 1.  Department of Homeland Security Shares of Total Spending by Type 
of Activity, 201725 
Often used interchangeably, the terms acquisition and procurement have different 
definitions and are governed by different DHS instructions and guidelines. Although for 
this study, and for the determination of instability, the job series studied support both 
acquisition and procurement, there is a distinction between the two at DHS. As defined by 
the 2016 DHS lexicon, a procurement “applies to the process of obtaining goods or 
services” while an acquisition includes a broader development effort of a system or 
capability.26 DoD Manual 5000.52 defines acquisition as “The planning, design, 
development, testing, contracting, production, introduction, acquisition logistics support, 
and disposal of systems, equipment, facilities, supplies, or services that are intended for 
use in, or support of, military missions.”27 Figure 2 is derived from DHS Acquisition 
25 Adapted from Edwards. 
26 DHS, DHS Lexicon Terms and Definitions, Instruction Manual 262-12-001-01 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 430. 
27 Department of Defense (DoD), Acquisition Career Development Program, DoD 5000.52-M 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), vi. 
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Management Instruction 102–01-001, which shows the complexity of the capability 
solution under development, evolving from procurement into a more complex acquisition 
program.28  
 
Figure 2.  Procurement versus Acquisition 
The acquisition community, also known as the acquisition workforce, delivers 
capability to DHS operators who secure the homeland. They must do so on time, within 
budget, and while meeting performance requirements. The DHS acquisition workforce 
includes “government personnel, who perform, supervise, manage, or oversee acquisition 
functions and activities” and those who perform acquisition support functions, but not those 
with “general administrative duties and those not directly involved in the acquisition 
process such as end users, operators, or maintainers of the items being acquired.”29 
Several headquarters offices support DHS major acquisition programs and 
procurement; because they fulfill a critical oversight function in the department, they are 
included in determination of instability. Key offices include Program Accountability and 
                                                 
28 DHS, Acquisition Management Instruction, 52. 
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Risk Management (PARM), Joint Requirements Council (JRC), and the Office of the Chief 
Procurement Officer (OCPO). PARM’s mission is to “develop and maintain acquisition 
program management policy.”30 Requirements management falls to the JRC. OCPO 
oversees and issues procurement regulations, policies, and instructions for the department. 
OCPO also “manages the Homeland Security Acquisition Institute (HSAI) [which] 
provides training, professional development, career management, and certification services 
to DHS acquisition personnel.”31 
E. RESEARCH METHOD 
Significant research to date has focused on the impact of cost, schedule, and 
performance characteristics on acquisition program success, such as the GAO’s annual 
review of acquisition programs at DHS. The purpose of this research is to explore the 
human capital assets within the DHS acquisition community. Factors explored include 
attrition rates, primary causes of employee loss, and acquisition program breaches within 
the DHS and DoD acquisition community, as well as in general private-industry fields. 
Attrition is the primary metric used in this study to determine instability; 
understanding attrition is therefore critical to this study. The majority of the literature 
simply defines attrition as the loss of employees over time:  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = Average number of employees who left
Average number of employees who were employed
. 
Attrition has been researched on many levels, across multiple industries; however, no fixed 
definition of instability within the acquisition workforce has been explored. For the purpose 
of this study, instability is defined as an attrition level within a job series of a component 
that is higher than the component’s average attrition rate for a given year. 
Data for this study came from the internal offices of DHS, published articles, and 
books related to acquisition program management or workforce development, and reports 
published by the GAO and other government offices. FedScope, the Office of Personnel 
30 DHS, Acquisition Management Instruction, 19. 
31 DHS, 9. 
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Management’s database, was also queried for data associated with attrition over the last 
five fiscal years, by component and job series. The FedScope database provides statistical 
data related to the government’s workforce. Subject areas available through the FedScope 
database include age, education, gender, length of service, grade, occupation, pay plan, 
salary, location, and agency. FedScope data is searchable by year from 1998 to 2008. Data 
collected since 2009 is searchable by quarter. Upon request, PARM and the Office of the 
Chief Human Capital Officer provided data related to staffing levels across the 
department’s acquisition workforce. DHS Policy Directive 102–05, Major Acquisition 
Program Staffing Management, requires component acquisition executives to identify 
critical acquisition positions and vacancies. 
The research process used in this study started with the collection of data, described 
in the previous paragraph, which was sorted and filtered down by component and job series 
for each of the years evaluated—fiscal year (FY)13–FY17. The data included annual end-
of-year on-the-roll numbers by job series and loss numbers by year, job series, and 
component; actual attrition values were calculated in Microsoft Excel. Additional data, 
such as program breaches, were then overlaid on figures to show potential relationships. 
Once the data were assembled and filtered, and attrition values calculated, they were either 
plotted on a graph or presented in a table (reviewed in Chapters III and IV). The data were 
then examined for trends and linkages. One linkage that was investigated, for example, was 
whether or not there was an increase in the attrition rate or number of resignations or 
retirements following a program breach. The opposite was investigated as well—if there 
was a program breach after an increased level of attrition or personnel loss. 
To determine if DHS’s acquisition workforce is unstable, the researcher determined 
if the total number of data points for attrition in a job series, by component, was higher 
than that component’s average annual attrition. If it was higher, it counted toward 
instability; if it was equal to or lower than the component’s average attrition, it was 
considered to be stable. With the components and directorates evaluated over the five-year 
period, there were 270 available data points to determine instability throughout the DHS 
acquisition workforce. The methodology was developed with a department-level 
evaluation in mind; however, it can also be used at the component level. While no research 
13 
was found related to workforce instability at DHS, the researcher assesses instability as a 
result showing 30 percent or more of the data points of a particular job series being higher 
than the component’s overall annual attrition rate. Therefore, the benchmark for 
determining whether the workforce is stable is 70 percent; in other words, 70 percent of all 
the data points need to be equal to or below the component’s average annual attrition rate. 
The actual determination of instability is addressed in Chapter V of this thesis. 
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II, the literature review, follows a top-down approach: it begins with an 
acquisition review, which is followed by a discussion of the literature available on the 
acquisition workforce. The chapter also discusses staffing of the workforce and attrition, 
identifies gaps in the existing literature, and provides a high-level review of the DHS 
acquisition life-cycle. Chapter III presents attrition data and analysis for each of the DHS 
components’ acquisition career fields. Chapter IV investigates other contributing factors 
and actions DHS can take to improve long-term stability in the workforce. The concluding 
chapter answers the research questions and provides recommendations for DHS to 
consider. 
14 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review conducted for this research followed a funneling model, as 
shown in Figure 3, beginning with the broad category of DHS acquisition and then 
narrowing the focus through the acquisition workforce, staffing of the workforce, and 
finally attrition. Most of the credible and relevant literature on these issues is found in 
government reports, journal articles, and academic texts. The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Departments of Defense 
(DoD), and DHS authored many of the government reports, guidelines, and instructions. 
Journal articles from the Defense Acquisition University, Defense Acquisition Research 
Journal, and the International Test and Evaluation Association provided further evidence. 
Finally, academic texts, including textbooks and theses written by students from various 
universities, round out the type and categories of literature reviewed.  
 




The primary focus of this research is the acquisition workforce; a general 
understanding of acquisition and its primary models is therefore important. While the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS, acquisition management within the 
department did not begin until 2008. Today, DHS acquisition management has grown; 
Acquisition Management Directive 102–01 now outlines the process DHS uses to manage 
acquisition efforts and, for FY17, the requested budget was $40 billion.32 
DHS developed an Acquisition Life cycle Framework (ALF), as shown in Figure 4, 
which provides a basis for planning and executing acquisitions. The ALF takes a capability 
gap or mission need through a well-defined, gated process, at the end of which the 
technology is delivered to the end user, thus closing the capability gap. The framework 
incorporates proven acquisition practices for program management, systems engineering, 
contracting, and test and evaluation, along with sustainment and support. The ALF at DHS 
has four phases: need, analyze/select, obtain, and produce/deploy/support/dispose. 
Acquisition decision events, or ADEs, are the gates, checkpoints, or milestones of typical 
project management models. Counting ADE 0, there are six ADEs: 0, 1, 2A, 2B, 2C, 
and 3.33 Certain requirements must be met before the process can move to the next ADE, 
or the next phase of development. This acquisition framework is important to understand 
upfront; Chapter IV discusses how staffing requirements increase or decrease based on the 
program’s position in the framework, and how this serves as a potential contributor to 
instability.  
                                                 
32 DHS, Acquisition Management Directive, 102-01 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2015), www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/01.%20Directive%20102-01%20Acquisition 
%20Management%20Directive_0.pdf; DHS, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2017 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2017). 
33 DHS, Acquisition Management Instruction, 38. 
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Figure 4.   DHS Acquisition Life Cycle Framework34 
The DHS acquisition framework is a somewhat simplified model adopted from the 
DoD. The DoD and DHS literature have many similarities. It is important to understand 
both departments in order to pinpoint the differences in their terminology and approaches 
to accomplishing the acquisition mission. Additionally, data and examples in Chapters III 
and IV are compared to industry in a number of cases. While no research was found to 
provide a framework for determining instability in private industry or government, many 
of the same management principles and processes are common if not similar. The Project 
Management Institute is widely known for the standards it publishes, which are adopted by 
project and program managers in private industry around the world.35 The Project 
Management Body of Knowledge, or PMBOK, is the Project Management Institute’s 
“flagship publication and is a fundamental resource for effective project management in 
any industry.”36 The book identifies five process areas: 1) initiating, 2) planning, 3) 
executing, 4) monitoring and controlling, and 5) closing.37 Each one of these process 
                                                 
34 Source: DHS, 38. 
35 Project Management Institute, Project Management Body of Knowledge, 4th ed. (Newton Square, 
PA: Project Management Institute, 2008), xxii. 
36 Project Management Institute, xxii. 
37 Project Management Institute, 43. 
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groups is in some way represented in both the DHS and DoD acquisition models and 
policies. The Project Management Institute takes a broader approach, however, to process 
definition, allowing industry to customize as needed to fit the needs of the organization; 
DHS and the DoD, on the other hand, specifically outline how processes must be followed. 
Both departments provide staffing updates at each of the gate reviews. 
Various offices within DHS conduct program-staffing assessments at several points 
throughout the ALF. During the analyze/select phase of the ALF, the program manager is 
responsible for creating a capability development plan—the first acquisition document that 
requires a staffing plan.38 Subsequent ADE events include staffing plans as well (such as 
in the program management plan), and staffing plans for subsequent ADE events are used 
to mitigate program risk.39 
1. Acquisition Management 
Before making a determination about instability in the acquisition workforce, we 
must first understand acquisition management and its governance. Most of the literature in 
this area focuses on best practices, policies, and procedures that the government and private 
industry use to manage acquisition programs. The purpose of the DoD’s Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook, released in 2003, is simply to give the department the guidance 
needed to conduct its acquisition programs.40 A more detailed, step-by-step guide comes 
from DoD Instruction 5000.02, in which 14 separate enclosures or chapters go into great 
depth about each step of the processes (DHS’s comparable guidance document is 
Acquisition Management Insturction 102–01, as discussed previously).41 For its annual 
budget, the DoD requested $582.7 billion dollars for FY17—several billion more than the 
                                                 
38 DHS, Acquisition Program Management Staffing, Instruction 102-01-006 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security 2016), 6. 
39 DHS, 6. 
40 DoD, Defense Acquisition Guidebook (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 
https://www.dau.mil/guidebooks/Shared%20Documents%20HTML/  DoDD%205000.01.aspx. 
41 DoD, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, Instruction 5000.02 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2015). 
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previous year, with billions of dollars being spent on an annual basis; thus, the process and 
procedures outlined for acquisition programs should be geared toward ensuring success.42  
2. The Failures 
While filling capability gaps and delivering technology to the end users may be the 
primary goals of any acquisition program, keeping the program on track to meet cost, 
schedule, and performance baselines is also essential. Once a program exceeds one of these 
baselines, the department declares a breach or a failed program. This thesis research 
searched for links between an unstable workforce and breached programs, and attempted 
to determine if a breached program leads to an unstable workforce. Chapter III identifies 
the number of program failures for each component during each of the five years covered 
in this study. 
There are many case studies and reports associated with acquisition program 
failures. For the government, most of these are GAO reports. As previously mentioned, 
one GAO report identifies that only 11 of 25 major acquisition programs were on track to 
meet schedule and cost goals in 2016.43 A preceding GAO report—from April 2015—
shows similar data and results. The 2016 GAO report also has an appendix, which discusses 
the objectives, scope, and methodology of the study the GAO undertook to review major 
acquisition programs at DHS.44 The methodology relied heavily on measuring program 
effectiveness against its established cost and schedule baselines. Negligently, however, the 
GAO did not address technical performance, which could be a key factor in potential cost 
and schedule overruns. The report also does not address the root causes of program failures. 
The GAO has published similar reports outlining DoD acquisition program challenges. 
                                                 
42 DoD, Defense Budget Overview (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017), 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/
FY2017_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. 
43 GAO, DHS Has Strengthened Management, 2. 
44 GAO, 56. 
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Industry failures, on the other hand, are not as well monitored or publicized. 
Although there are a number of articles that discuss industry failures, their credibility is 
questionable.  
B. ACQUISITION WORKFORCE 
Various organizations use different terminology and definitions when discussing 
the acquisition workforce. While the primary purpose of this research is to identify 
instability in the DHS acquisition workforce, it is also important to understand how other 
organizations view the acquisition workforce, as this study compares data from various 
agencies.   
In in 1974, Congress began the process of improving the acquisition workforce by 
creating the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), which is responsible for 
developing government-wide policies. OFPP then established the Federal Acquisition 
Institute (FAI), the responsibilities and authorities of which are addressed in the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy Act in Title 41 of the United States Code.45 The FAI’s 
definition of the acquisition workforce, however, has a critical shortcoming. A review of 
FAI’s annual reports reveals that the institute has a narrow focus: it works only with the 
contracting officers, contracting officers’ representatives, and program managers. 
Acquisition of technologies requires a much broader team to ensure success. Engineers, 
logisticians, and information technology representatives all play key roles in delivering 
capabilities to the end user in a timely, cost-efficient manner. Contracting professionals 
and program managers do not deliver capability in a vacuum; they rely on a team of 
individuals with unique skill sets to accomplish the acquisition mission. The GAO backs 
this up in one of its reports, stating, “Having a broader definition is important because it is 
one method to facilitate agencies’ efforts to ensure that training reaches all staff integral to 
the success of a contract.”46 
                                                 
45 “Legislative Authority,” Federal Acquisition Institute, accessed March 21, 2018, www.fai.gov/ 
drupal/about/legislative-authority. 
46 GAO, Agencies Need to Better Define and Track the Training of Their Employees, GAO-02-737 
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, July 2002), 8. 
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The DoD and DHS acquisition workforce includes “contracting, program, 
technical, budget, financial, logistics, scientific, and engineering personnel.”47 The 
Clinger-Cohen Act required agencies to expand the definition of acquisition workforce, 
and “OFPP Policy Letter 97–01 identified acquisition workforce positions, in addition to 
contracting and purchasing specialist, to include contracting officers, Contracting Officer 
Representatives (CORs) and Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTRs).”48
Other government agencies have added to the definition as well; for example, the Veterans 
Administration “includes program managers and procurement clerks”; the Department of 
Energy accounts for program and property managers; and Health and Human Services and 
NASA now include procurement clerks.49 
1. Staffing of the Workforce
Two reports published by the GAO in 2016 and 2017 discuss the staffing of 
acquisition programs. The reports provide a top-level overview of each program, highlight 
their staffing requirements, and identify the number of acquisition professionals a program 
needs to accomplish its mission. This data is presented in the following chapters as a basis 
of the research. 
In “Planning in the Dark: Why Major Engineering Projects Fail,” Philip Lawrence’s 
and Jim Scanlan’s research focuses on the aerospace industry, which they believe is 
relevant to all industries.50 The authors identify eight critical elements of project success 
or failure: 
• poor initial planning
• lack of clear objectives and deliverables
47 GAO, 8. 
48 GAO, 10. 
49 GAO, 10. 
50 Philip Lawrence and James Scanlan, “Planning in the Dark: Why Major Engineering Projects Fail 
to Achieve Key Goals,” Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 19, no. 4 (2007): 509. 
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• lack of understanding of dependencies 
• inadequate resource allocation 
• poor risk analysis 
• poor change management 
• lack of “buy-in” from stakeholders 
• poor understanding of priorities.51 
Five of these factors are tied to instability. One outlier is change management, 
which is more commonly referred to as configuration management and is not directly tied 
to the workforce (other than the need for configuration analysts in programs). The second 
outlier deals more closely with contract objectives and deliverables, and product of the 
workforce—it is not a factor in the determination of instability. The final element not tied 
to the discussion of instability is the lack of buy-in, which typically includes 
communications with the customer or end users in the requirements gathering stages, or 
design reviews during development of a technology system.  
Poor initial planning, lack of understanding about dependencies, inadequate 
resource allocation, poor risk analysis, and poor understanding of priorities all link back to 
workforce instability. Poor initial planning can mean human capital requirements were not 
forecasted adequately, which has a direct relationship to this study. A lack of dependencies 
and resource allocation applies to human capital assets as well—the program manager 
needs the right people in the right place at the right time to perform the acquisition mission; 
failure of planning leads to potential instability. The final element’s responsibility lies with 
the program manager, whose job is to clearly understand human capital priorities; if the 
project is managed well and the priorities are understood, instability will be minimized.  
Additionally, “Department of Defense Acquisition Program Terminations: 
Analysis of 11 Program Management Factors” by Patrick Clowney, Jason Dever, and 
                                                 
51 Lawrence and Scanlan, 509. 
23 
Steven Stuben highlights 10 predictive factors tied to acquisition program success.52 The 
fifth of the ten factors deals with “personnel and recruitment” considerations.53 With a 
number of pieces of literature discussing the need to address human capital in an 
acquisition program, this thesis further explores the subject of human capital within DHS 
acquisition programs. 
Only one piece of literature defined the minimum timeframe any professional 
should be required to serve in an acquisition position. DHS Instruction 102–01-006, 
Acquisition Program Management Staffing, “recommends program managers serve a 
minimum of four years, or until the next ADE.”54 The instruction suggests this timeframe 
due to the significance of the program manager position. Additionally, this commitment 
allows for leadership continuity through acquisition events, ideally leading to improved 
acquisition outcomes. The four-year tenure appears reasonable; the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics identified the median tenure of 4.2 years in 2016 across the combined private 
industry and public service.55 Additionally, the Bureau of Labor Statistics declared, 
“Among the major occupations, workers in management, professional, and related 
occupations had the highest median tenure (5.1 years) in January 2016.”56 The program 
manager was the only position identified in a review of DHS literature to have a 
recommended term of service. Other critical positions, such as the systems engineer, test 
manager, and contracting officer, have no recommended term of service. This shortcoming 
suggests an overemphasis on the criticality of the program manager and an under-emphasis 
on the need for a team of professionals to deliver programs on time and within budget, and 
that meet performance objectives. 
                                                 
52 Patrick Clowney, Jason Dever, and Steven Stuben, “Department of Defense Acquisition Program 
Terminations: Analysis of 11 Program Management Factors,” Acquisition Research Journal 23, no. 3 (July 
2016): 306. 
53 Clowney, Dever, and Stuben, 306. 
54 DHS, Acquisition Program Management Staffing, 8. 
55 “Employee Tenure in 2016,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, September 22, 2016, https://www.bls.gov/ 
news.release/tenure.nr0.htm. 
56 Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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By comparison, the DoD acquisition community is governed by the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), approved in 1991. The DAWIA 
outlines which acquisition positions are considered part of the acquisition community, as 
well as the training and certification requirements for each of the acquisition disciplines.57 
2. Attrition 
Attrition is the primary metric used in this study to evaluate instability in the 
acquisition workforce. One of the leading causes and future concerns of attrition comes 
from the aging government workforce. A significant amount of literature focuses on the 
soon-to-retire government workforce and the loss of experience and knowledge that will 
follow. Yvonne Kochanowski discusses the history of government retirement in the 
Journal of Health and Human Services Administration. The history starts in the mid-1970s, 
when it was projected that almost half of government executives and middle managers 
were eligible to retire. In the 1990s, Kochanowski explains, the GAO proposed a plan of 
trial retirements to sustain the institutional knowledge of the government, allowing 
transition of knowledge to the younger workforce. Then, in the early 2000s, census data 
from 2006 showed that “69% of federal workers, 60% of state workers and 64% of local 
government workers were over the age of 40.”58  
C. GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
A plethora of literature exists when it comes to acquisition in general. Currently, 
the majority of literature and data on the government side comes from the DoD acquisition 
community, resulting from its long tenure when compared to DHS. As DHS continues to 
age, the literature and data available for research will certainly grow; the department 
maintains a status of high visibility compared to other government organizations. 
The available literature about the acquisition workforce once again was focused on 
the DoD and its long-term experiences. One gap identified in the literature review was the 
                                                 
57 “Legal Information Institute,” Cornell Law School, July 17, 2018, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
uscode/text/10/subtitle-A/part-II/chapter-87. 
58 Yvonne J. Kochanowski, “Human Capital Management in Government: Replacing Government 
Retirees,” Journal of Health and Human Services Administration 34, no. 1 (2011): 85–108. 
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correlation between acquisition workforce effectiveness and acquisition program 
outcomes. In other words, is there an impact to acquisition programs resulting from a 
marginally staffed or marginally qualified workforce? No literature exists regarding career-
development models or career paths for the DHS acquisition workforce, which would 
support human capital retention. And while recent GAO reports highlight staffing 
requirements and shortages, no data exist to describe why those vacancies exist or what 
actions are being taken to fill them.  
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III. DATA
This chapter presents attrition data for the job series most likely to support 
acquisition programs at DHS. Those series, presented in detail within Chapter I, Table 1, 
are 0340 (program management), 0343 (management and program analysis), 0801 
(engineering), 1102 (contracting), 1515 (operational research analyst), and 2210 
(information technology specialist). In 2017, the DHS chief procurement officer reported 
an acquisition workforce of 12,865 professionals supporting the acquisition mission.59
Figure 5 provides a distributed breakdown of the acquisition workforce by DHS 
component.60 
Figure 5.  DHS Total Acquisition Workforce61 
59 DHS Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, Acquisition Workforce Strategic Human Capital 
Plan Fiscal Years 2013–2017 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017). 
60 DHS Office of the Chief Procurement Officer. 


















Each section of this chapter starts with a brief description of the component and an 
overview of the component’s acquisition portfolio, which helps identify the types of 
commodities the component develops. This information is important because the 
development of an information technology (IT) system prevents different challenges than 
the development of, say, a border security system. This difference is key in looking at the 
component’s data, as an IT system will appear to lack the 0801 series (engineer) yet will 
have an increase in the number of 2210 (information technology specialist). Likewise, a 
border security program within CBP may have an increased number of 0801 engineers 
managing the development of sensor technologies and not have as many 2210 information 
technology specialists as an ICE program developing the immigration IT system.  
Each section then describes the data for each component. The first table presented 
in each section shows the attrition rates for each of the job series over the last five years. 
The last row of data on each of those tables presents the component’s overall attrition rate, 
which accounts for all job series staffed by that particular component. The next figure 
displayed for each component shows the total number of employees for each job series, 
during each of the five years, and the attrition rate for the series during each year. Since 
attrition is determined by dividing the number of employees who left by the total number 
of employees, job series with low numbers may appear to have high attrition rates—which 
is the reason actual on-roll numbers are presented in this study. The final figure in each 
section describes how many employees left the component, and why they did so. This 
figure also identifies the program breaches the component experienced in each fiscal year. 
The intent of highlighting the program breaches is to identify any human capital trends 
within the workforce that lead to or result from a program breach. The components’ data 
are presented in order from the largest acquisition workforce to the smallest. Figures and 
tables are presented for each of the components studied, regardless of any trends identified 
or significant discussion, for comparison and completeness purposes. 
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A. U.S. COAST GUARD 
According to its website, “The mission of the United States Coast Guard is to ensure 
our Nation’s maritime safety, security and stewardship.”62 In order to accomplish its 
mission, the USCG relies on a number of assets in the field. As listed in DHS’s Major 
Acquisition Oversight List (MAOL), dated April 2018, a dozen of these systems are major 
acquisition programs under development by the USCG according the DHS’s Major 
Acquisition Oversight List (MAOL) dated April 2018, which include: 
• 47 foot Motor Lifeboat Service Life Extension Program (MLB SLEP)
• C4ISR
• Fast Response Cutter (FRC)
• H-65 Helicopter Conversion – Sustainment Projects
• Long Range Surveillance Aircraft (C-130H-J)
• H-60 SLEP Medium Range Recovery Helicopter (MRR)
• Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft (MRS)
• National Security Cutter (NSC)
• Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS)
• Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC)
• Polar Ice Breaker
• Waterways Commerce Cutter (WCC).63
62 “Missions,” United States Coast Guard, accessed April 26, 2018, https://www.overview.uscg.mil/ 
Missions/. 
63 DHS, Master Acquisition Oversight List (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
April 2018), 5. 
30 
The first table in each of the component’s data sections is common throughout this 
chapter. The table presents attrition values calculated for each of the study years and each 
job series in the scope of this study. Furthermore, the component’s calculated attrition rate, 
which includes all job series, is provided for each fiscal year. Highlighted data cells 
indicate an attrition value that is greater than the component’s attrition value, which is later 
used to calculate instability. For the USCG, this information is shown in Table 3. 
Importantly, as shown in Table 3, in FY13 three of the six USCG job series 
investigated showed attrition rates above the component average. Aslo, the 1102 series 
experienced higher attrition rates than the component average in all years except FY13.  
Table 3.   USCG Attrition Rates by Discipline64 
 
Note: Red cells indicate an attrition rate higher than the component average. 
 
Figure 6 presents the actual end-of-year number of personnel on roll for each of the 
fiscal years and each job series—these are the bars on the graph with the numeric values 
on the primary axis on the left-hand side; a similar figure will appear in each section of this 
chapter. The dots are the attrition values presented in Table 3, for each job series and year 
of the study, utilizing the secondary axis values on the right-hand side of the figure. 
Figure 6 identifies a steep decline in the attrition rate of 0340, program analysts, in 
the USCG between FY13 and FY17, from 11 percent to 2 percent. Meanwhile, the attrition 
rate for 0343 program managers appears to hover around 6 percent over the period of 
                                                 
64 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “FY13–FY17 On-Roll Various Job 
Series” (unpublished dataset, May 1, 2018).  
Series FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
340 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.02
343 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
801 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.06 0.04
1102 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.1
1515 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.07 0
2210 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06
Component 0.08 0.11 0.1 0.1 0.06
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review. The attrition rate varied; it was 10 percent in FY15 and only 4 percent in FY17 for 
engineers, while the operational research analyst also saw a shift—ranging from 12 percent 
in FY13 to 0 percent in FY17. Finally, one of the largest job series being evaluated for the 
USCG, the 2210 series, saw a decline in both attrition and total employees from the start 
of FY13, with a gradual decline in attrition rate from 10 percent in FY13 to 5 percent in 
FY16 and only a moderate 1-percent increase in FY17. It would be helpful to know what 
led to the decrease in attrition within this job series and what the Coast Guard did or 
changed to effect such a change.
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Figure 6.  USCG—End of FY on Roll by Series and Series Attrition Rates65 
                                                 
65 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer. 
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Figure 7—like the final figure in each forthcoming section—identifies the primary 
causes of attrition for the component (in this case, the USCG), with component breaches 
overlaid to determine if there are any links between the two data points. The data bars show 
the primary reasons why employees left that particular job series in a particular year. These 
bars correspond to the primary axis on the left side of the figure for numeric values. On the 
secondary access, with the numeric values on the right side of the figure, are dots that show 
the number of program breaches the component experienced in a given year.  
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Figure 7.   USCG—Primary Cause of Reported Attrition with Component Breaches66
                                                 
66  Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer. 
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Job series 1102, contracting specialists, saw an increase in total number of losses—
from 26 to 44 between FY13 and FY14. The primary cause of this increase was voluntary 
retirements. In FY13, the 2210 series experienced its highest loss of personnel over the 
period evaluated, and also saw a decline in total personnel loss over the following three 
years. Voluntary retirements were the leading cause of attrition for this job series as well. 
Over the last decade, the topic of the government’s aging, retirement-eligible workforce 
has been highly publicized. These findings from two separate job series, in different years, 
drive the question, What pushes an individual to a point of submitting a retirement package 
in the government? 
B. DIRECTORATE FOR MANAGEMENT 
According to the DHS website, 
The Directorate for Management is responsible for budget, appropriations, 
expenditure of funds, accounting and finance; procurement; human 
resources and personnel; information technology systems; facilities, 
property, equipment, and other material resources; and identification and 
tracking of performance measurements relating to the responsibilities of the 
Department.67  
Similar to the S&T Directorate, the Directorate for Management’s role in acquisition is 
primarily assistance, engagement, and oversight. Also referred to as Headquarters (or HQ), 
this directorate is the designated developing agency for two major acquisition programs 
listed on the MAOL, the Financial Systems Modernization (TRIO), and St. Elizabeth’s 
Headquarters’ consolidation construction programs.68 
The data in Table 4 raise a concern with two Headquarters jobs series. First, 0801, 
engineer, has attrition rates higher than the component as a whole in both FY14 and FY15, 
with the attrition rate more than double that of the component in FY15. Second, 1515, 
operational research analyst, also had higher-than-component averages in FY13 and FY14, 
at 12 percent and 25 percent, respectively. 
67 “Operational and Support Components,” DHS, March 7, 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/operational-
and-support-components. 
68 DHS, Master Acquisition Oversight List, 2. 
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Table 4.   HQ Attrition Rates by Discipline69 
 
Note: Red cells indicate an attrition rate higher than the component average. 
 
Figure 8 shows why the attrition rates are so high for both the 0801 and 1515 series: 
simply put, the on-the-roll numbers were low. And, based on the results of Figure 9, series 
0343, program management, warrants discussion. First, a steady increase in voluntary 
retirements between FY14 and FY16 caused the attrition rate to increase to 9 percent in 
both FY15 and FY16. Second, resignations almost doubled—from 7 to 13—in FY15. 
Third, the component experienced an average of 16 “termination-appt ins,” which the 
Office of Personnel Management defines as “separation action[s] initiated by either the 
employee or the agency when the employee (or group of employees) moves from one 
agency to another agency.”70 Finally, in FY16, 20 personnel from the program 
management community on temporary appointments reached the end of their obligation.
                                                 
69 Adapted from DHS, Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “On-Roll Job Series.” 
70 Office of Personnel Management, “Separations by Other than Retirement,” in The Guide to 
Processing Personnel Actions, through Update 72 (Washington, DC: Office of Personnel Management, 
2017), 31-4, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/personnel-
documentation/processing-personnel-actions/gppa31.pdf. 
Series FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
340 0.05 0.13 0.1 0.05 0.21
343 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.05
801 0.09 0.1 0.25 0.08 0.07
1102 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.1
1515 0.12 0.25 0 0 0.09
2210 0.1 0.07 0.1 0.1 0.09
Component 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.09
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Figure 8.   Headquarters—End of FY on Roll by Series and Series Attrition Rate71 
                                                 
71 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “On-Roll Job Series.” 
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Figure 9.   Headquarters—Primary Cause of Reported Attrition72
                                                 
72 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer. 
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C. SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE 
The Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) is the research and development arm 
of DHS. As mentioned in Chapter I, S&T has two primary offices that support major 
acquisition programs; both reside under the Capability Development Support Group. First 
is the Office of Test and Evaluation, which is the department’s performance assessment 
team, responsible for determining if systems under development are effective, suitable, and 
secure. The second is the Office of Systems Engineering, which provides technical 
assessments, requirements development expertise, and human factors engineering support 
to programs throughout the acquisition life-cycle. The National Biological and Agriculture 
Facility—under construction in Manhattan, Kansas—is the only major acquisition program 
for which S&T is currently accountable. As a facility construction project, it is not included 
in the discussion of program breaches.73 The majority of acquisition support provided to 
all of the DHS components from S&T comes in the form of assistance, engagement, and 
oversight; therefore, program breaches are not identified in Figure 11. 
FY14 was a year of higher attrition rates at S&T, as shown in Table 5, with half of 
the job series experiencing higher attrition rates than the component as a whole. The low 
attrition rates shown in Table 5 and Figure 11 suggest employees at S&T are satisfied with 
their current work. 
Table 5.    S&T Attrition Rates by Discipline74 
Note: Red cells indicate an attrition rate higher than the component average. 
73 DHS, Master Acquisition Oversight List, 3. 
74 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “On-Roll Job Series.” 
Series FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
340 0.17 0.11 0.17 0 0.04
343 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.06
801 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.04
1102 0 0 0 0 0
1515 0 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.06
2210 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.14 0.04
Component 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.06
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Figure 10 highlights S&T’s primary mission, research and development; it has the 
most engineers and operational research analysts on roll. Understandably, series 0801, 
engineering, is the highlight of Figure 11. An increase in resignation, voluntary retirements, 
and the end of temporary appointments in FY15 are the causes of the increased attrition. 
Because DHS cannot identify personnel who directly support the acquisition mission—and 
because we can speculate that the majority of engineers reside at S&T—the spike is 
unlikely to be the result of, or a contributing factor in, any breaches.
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Figure 10.  S&T—End of FY on Roll by Series and Series Attrition Rate75 
                                                 
75 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer. 
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Figure 11.  S&T—Primary Cause of Attrition76
                                                 
76  Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer. 
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D. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
FEMA’s website simply defines the organization’s mission as “Helping people 
before, during, and after disasters.”77 FEMA currently has four major acquisition programs 
under development, involving grants management modernization, public warning systems, 
logistics supply chain management, and national flood insurance.78 
FEMA’s acquisition community attrition rates tend to stay equal or below the 
component averages over the reviewed period, other than FY17 when the 0340, 0801, and 
2210 job series witnessed attrition rates greater than the component’s average. Table 6 
shows that FY17 has the most data points (three altogether) above the component average; 
FY16 only had one data point above the component average, and none of the data points 
between FY13 and FY15 were higher than the component average. 
Table 6.   FEMA Attrition Rates by Discipline79 
Note: Red cells indicate an attrition rate higher than the component average. 
77 “About the Agency,” FEMA, accessed March 26, 2018, https://www.fema.gov/about-agency. 
78 DHS, Master Acquisition Oversight List, 2. 
79 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “On-Roll Job Series.” 
Series FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
340 0.11 0.09 0.1 0.06 0.13
343 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07
801 0.2 0 0 0.13 0.24
1102 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.06
1515 0 0 0 0.2 0
2210 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.1
Component 0.25 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.08
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For job series with low end-of-year on-roll numbers, such as engineers and operational 
research analysts, the attrition rates appear higher when graphed and compared to other job 
series (see Figure 12). However, further investigation revealed that FEMA only lost four 
engineers in FY17, providing another example of why attrition rate in and of itself may not 
be an effective metric for disciplines with lower head counts. The total number of 0343 
program managers increased over the five years investigated, from 52 in FY13, peaking at 
76 in FY15, and closing out FY17 at 70, as shown in Figure 13. While the end-of-year on-
roll numbers grew for FEMA in the 0343 series, there was an increase in FY15 of voluntary 
retirements and resignations, with two program breaches, and a single program breach in 
FY14. In FY15, the total number of 0343 employees who left FEMA increased by 22 from 
the previous year.  
Series 2210, information technology specialists, also experienced a spike in 
resignations in FY17. The component’s last year with an experienced breach was FY15, 
when it breached two acquisition programs. A detailed review of exactly when the breaches 
occurred within the fiscal year could reveal further information to establish a link between 
the breached event and increased resignations.
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Figure 12.  FEMA—End of FY on Roll by Series and Series Attrition Rate80
80 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer. 
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Figure 13.  FEMA—Primary Cause of Reported Attrition with Component Breaches81
                                                 
81  Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer. 
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E. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 
According to CBP’s web page, the component’s mission is “To safeguard 
America’s borders thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and materials 
while enhancing the Nation’s global economic competitiveness by enabling legitimate 
trade and travel.”82 Agents currently use some technologies that were fielded before DHS 
was established, while others technologies are being developed to specifically mitigate 
emerging threats. 
According to the April 2018 DHS MAOL, CBP currently has a dozen major 
acquisition programs under development these programs include the following: 
• Automated Commercial Environment (ACE)
• Biometric Entry-Exit
• Cross Border Tunnel Threat (CBTT)
• Integrated Fixed Towers (IFTs)
• Medium Lift Helicopter, H-60
• Multi-role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA)
• Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS)
• Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) Systems Program
• Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS)
• Tactical Communication (TACCOMN) Modernization
• TECS Modernization
• The Wall.83
82 “About CBP,” Customs and Border Protection, accessed March 26, 2018, www.cbp.gov/about. 
83 DHS, Master Acquisition Oversight List, 2. 
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 The CBP acquisition portfolio is broad, ranging from aircraft, to information and 
communications systems, to sensors, and “the wall” directed by President Trump under 
Executive Order 13767.84 The breadth of the technology portfolio highlights the various 
challenges and skill sets the acquisition workforce must be ready to work with.  
As shown in Table 7, a number of job series experienced a marginally higher 
attrition rate than the component average. The 0340, program analyst, and 0801, 
engineering, series rates were higher than the component average for each of the five years. 
CBP maintained its low number of operational research analysts throughout the five years 
investigated and grew the job series from one to 11.  
Table 7.   CBP Attrition Rates by Discipline85 
 
Note: Red cells indicate an attrition rate higher than the component average. 
 
The attrition rate for the 0343 series shown in Figure 14 corresponds well to the 
data in Figure 15, highlighting a substantial increase in a year after the component 
experienced two breaches. While the total number of 0801 engineers only varied by 40 
over the five years, this suggests CBP has an active recruiting process in place. In 
Figure 14, the 0801 engineering series provides a good example of why just evaluating 
attrition rate itself can be misleading. In FY15, the series had a 13 percent attrition rate. 
Diving deeper into the data, however, the net loss was only three engineers; five of the nine 
                                                 
84 Donald J. Trump, “Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement 
Improvements,” The White House, January 25, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/
executive-order-border-security-immigration-enforcement-improvements/. 
85  Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “On-Roll Job Series.” 
Series FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
340 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05
343 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06
801 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.07 0.06
1102 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.1
1515 0 0 0 0 0
2210 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
Component 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
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total engineer losses in FY15 were a result of resignations. There is room for speculation 
when looking at the data. For example, could the loss of engineering talent in FY15 have 
led to program breaches in FY16, as shown in Figure 15? Further research, evaluation, and 
interviewing with the component would be required to determine if such a link exists. 
In 2016, CBP experienced two program breaches, and two job series showed 
increases in voluntary retirements the following year according. Twice the number of 
program managers (0343 series) retired, and resignations increased the year following the 
program breaches. Additionally, the 1102 series, contract management specialist, also 
experienced an increase in retirements following the FY16 breaches.
50 
Figure 14.  CBP—End of FY on Roll by Series and Series Attrition Rate86 
86  Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer. 
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Figure 15.  CBP—Primary Cause of Reported Attrition with Component Breaches87
87  Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer. 
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F. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
The TSA’s webpage describes its mission as to “protect the nation’s transportation 
systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.”88 The TSA has three 
programs on the MAOL, each with its own program office and staff: the Electronic 
Baggage Screening Program, the Passenger Screening Program, and the Technology 
Infrastructure Modernization program.89 The attrition rates of those job series supporting 
the acquisition mission at TSA are below the component averages throughout the period 
of study, as presented in Table 8. All of TSA’s acquisition workforce attrition rates are 
either less than or equal to the component’s overall attrition rate. 
Table 8.   TSA Attrition Rates by Discipline90 
 
  
                                                 
88 “Mission,” Transportation Security Administration, accessed April 26, 2018, https://www.tsa.gov/ 
about/tsa-mission. 
89 DHS, Master Acquisition Oversight List, 3. 
90 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “On-Roll Job Series.” 
Series FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
340 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.06
343 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05
801 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.02
1102 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.1 0.09
1515 0.06 0 0.1 0.05 0.1
2210 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.06
Component 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.1
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TSA’s overall workforce attrition rates ranged from 10–14 percent over the five-
year period, as shown in Figure 16. This 10–14-percent average attrition rate is the highest 
of any DHS component. In a 2007 report, the GAO highlighted the high turnover rate of 
the TSA’s transportation security officers; at the time, these officers made up almost one-
third of the DHS workforce, driving both the TSA’s and DHS’s attrition rates higher when 
compiled.91 
TSA experienced seven total breaches over the five-year study period, as plotted in 
Figure 17. The 0343, program manager, series did experience a loss of 334 employees over 
five years at TSA; however, with an average end-of-year on-the-roll number of 980, the 
loss of knowledge and impact to acquisition programs is presumed to be negligible.
91 GAO, DHS’s Actions to Recruit and Retain Staff and Comply with the Vacancies Reform Act, 
GAO-07-758 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2007), 5. 
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Figure 16.  TSA—End of FY on Roll by Series and Series Attrition Rate92 
92 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “On-Roll Job Series.” 
55 
 
Figure 17.  TSA—Primary Cause of Reported Attrition with Component Breaches93
                                                 
93 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer. 
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G. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
According to ICE’s website, its “mission is to protect America from the cross-
border crime and illegal immigration that threaten national security and public safety. This 
mission is executed through the enforcement of more than 400 federal statutes and focuses 
on smart immigration enforcement, preventing terrorism, and combating the illegal 
movement of people and goods.”94 In order to meet the technology needs, the component 
has two major acquisition programs: the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System 
and a program called T-8, which is a law enforcement information technology program to 
modernize case management.95 
As shown in Table 9, ICE has some attrition challenges. With the exception of the 
0801 series (engineers), of which ICE only had one from FY13 to FY17, attrition rates for 
individual series are two to three times higher or more than the component average in 
several of the observed years (see Figure 18). 
Table 9.   ICE Attrition Rates by Discipline96 
 
Note: Red cells indicate an attrition rate higher than the component average. 
 
 
                                                 
94 “What We Do,” Immigration and Customs Enforcement, accessed, March 6, 2018, www.ice.gov/ 
overview#wcm-survey-target-id. 
95 DHS, Master Acquisition Oversight List, 2. 
96 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “On-Roll Job Series.” 
Series FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
340 0.07 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.15
343 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04
801 0 0 0 0 0
1102 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.03
1515 0 0 1 0.14 0.25
2210 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.06
Component 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
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Figure 18 displays a rather low and consistent attrition rate over the job series (aside 
from than the 1515 series), which can be the sign of a satisfied workforce. ICE maintained 
just over 800 total program managers (0343 series) over the five-year period, with attrition 
rates below or just one percentage point above the component’s average. Retirements and 
the end of temporary appointments are the leading causes of loss within the 0343 series. 
ICE faced a single breach in both FY14 and FY15; however, the data set has no indications 
of their causes or effects. Figure 19 highlights the number of people who departed the ICE 
acquisition workforce and for what primary reasons.
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Figure 18.  ICE—End of FY on Roll by Series and Series Attrition Rate97 
                                                 
97 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer.  
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Figure 19.  ICE—Primary Cause of Reported Attrition with Component Breaches98
                                                 
98 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer.  
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H. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE 
The USCIS webpage declares that it “administers the nation’s lawful immigration 
system, safeguarding its integrity and promise by efficiently and fairly adjudicating 
requests for immigration benefits while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and 
honoring our values.”99 USCIS currently has two programs on the MAOL, one called 
Transformation and the other named Verification Modernization, both of which are IT 
programs focused on immigration and citizenship.100 
Table 10 shows the 1102 series, contracting officials, withstanding higher attrition 
rates than the component averages, along with three other series (0340, 1515, and 2210) in 
FY17. The next chapter addresses 1102 movement in detail. 
Table 10.   USCIS Attrition Rates by Discipline101 
 
Note: Red cells indicate an attrition rate higher than the component average. 
 
Figure 20 highlights the increase in attrition among the 0340 series starting in FY14, 
even as the end-of-year on-roll numbers gradually increased. One interesting trend 
observed in Figure 20 is that, in job series except the 0801 engineering discipline, the end-
of-year on-roll numbers increased at least slightly every year starting in FY13. A 2017 
                                                 
99 “About Us,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, accessed 26 April 2018, 
https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus. 
100 DHS, Master Acquisition Oversight List, 3. 
101 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “On-Roll Job Series.”  
Series FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
340 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.1
343 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03
801 0 0 0 0 0
1102 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.1 0.02
1515 0 0 0 0.03 0.06
2210 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06
Component 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04
61 
report by the USCIS ombudsman presents two facts that may be leading to the increase. 
First, when discussing how the demand for assistance has been growing, the report states,  
While we believe this growth in requests is partly due to increasing 
awareness of the services we provide, it is also the result of an immigration 
system that is expanding, both in complexity and in the benefits it offers. 
Indeed, between creating new immigration programs, expanding the classes 
of aliens who qualify for existing programs, and a general increase in 
applications, USCIS’ workload has grown significantly over the past 
several years. In FY 2016 alone, USCIS received approximately 8.070 
million applications for benefits, a 5 percent increase over FY 2015 and a 
34 percent increase over FY 2012.102 
While the job series supporting the acquisition community at USCIS did not directly 
increase because of a growing immigration system, the need for technology that supports 
the immigration system may have grown. More personnel are therefore needed to support 
technology acquisition within the USCIS mission space. 
Second, the report highlighted issues with USCIS’s Transformation initiative. 
According to the GAO, this initiative will “Enable electronic adjudication and case 
management tools that would allow users to apply and track their applications online.”103 
Both the ombudsman report and GAO report allude to the fact that USCIS needed increased 
resources for resources for this initiative, although neither say that the resources were tied 
to human capital. We can strongly speculate, however, that additional human capital assets 
were brought on board to fix and deliver the needed capabilities. 
USCIS only has one reported breach, in FY13. Figure 21 shows an increase in 
program analyst departures after the breach, primarily attributed to voluntary retirements; 
however, Figure 20 shows an increase in the total program analyst workforce, from 80 in 
FY13 to 114 in FY17, with a gradual increase in attrition rate. While the component 
appears to have taken steps to build up its workforce, the attrition rate continues to climb, 
which could mean an internal factor within USCIS led to the loss of 0340 program analysts.
                                                 
102 USCIS Ombudsman, Annual Report 2017: Citizenship and Immigration Services (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017).  
103 Carol C. Harris, Immigration Benefits System Significant Risk in USCIS’s Efforts to Develop its 
Adjudication and Case Management System, GAO-17-486T (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2017), 2. 
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Figure 20.  USCIS—End of FY on Roll by Series and Series Attrition Rate104 
                                                 
104 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “On-Roll Job Series.”  
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Figure 21.  USCIS—Primary Cause of Reported Attrition with Component Breaches105
                                                 
105 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer.  
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I. U.S. SECRET SERVICE 
The USSS sustains two key missions. First, 
The Secret Service is recognized for the physical protection it provides to 
the nation’s highest elected leaders, visiting foreign dignitaries, facilities 
and major events. In order to ensure a secure environment for protectees, 
the Secret Service integrates a variety of innovative technologies and 
maintains a highly skilled and motivated workforce.106 
While this mission is well known, the USSS has a lesser-known investigative mission 
as well: 
The agency’s investigative mission has evolved from enforcing 
counterfeiting laws to safeguarding the payment and financial systems of 
the United States from a wide range of financial and computer-based 
crimes. To combat these crimes, the Secret Service has adopted a proactive 
approach, using advanced technologies and capitalizing on the power of 
task force partnerships.107 
The USSS only has one program on the MAOL, the Information Integration and 
Technology Transformation program.108 With an acquisition workforce of only 186 
employees spread among the six job series analyzed in this study, inferring any trends or 
speculating about cause-and-effect relationships would be inappropriate. Table 11, Figure 
22, and Figure 23 are provided for comparison to other components’ data and completeness 
of the study, as the USSS plays a vital role in the homeland security enterprise. 
                                                 
106 “The Protective Mission,” Secret Service, accessed April 26, 2018, www.secretservice.gov/ 
protection/. 
107 “The Investigative Mission,” Secret Service, accessed April 26, 2018, www.secretservice.gov/ 
investigation/. 
108 DHS, Master Acquisition Oversight List, 3. 
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Table 11.   USSS Attrition Rates by Discipline109 
 
Note: Red cells indicate an attrition rate higher than the component average. 
                                                 
109 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “On-Roll Job Series.”  
Series FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
340 0 0 0 0 0
343 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.06
801 0.11 0.09 0.3 0 0.13
1102 0.16 0 0.21 0.3 0.13
1515 0 0 0 0 0
2210 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03
Component 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.05
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Figure 22.  USSS—End of FY on Roll by Series and Series Attrition Rate110 
                                                 
110 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer.  
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Figure 23.  USSS—Primary Cause of Reported Attrition with Component Breaches111
                                                 
111 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer.  
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J. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA  
DHS is compared to the DoD in many regards; therefore this study also reviewed 
attrition of similar job series in the DoD. Figure 24 compares DoD and DHS attrition rates 
over a five-year period by job series. 
 
Figure 24.   DoD versus DHS Attrition by Job Series112 
Data collected for DHS, which shows the major components and two headquarters 
elements, was consistent with the rest of the research. The DoD data only show attribution 
rates for the Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, and Department of the 
Navy, to avoid the entirety of the DoD overhead; because much of the DoD acquisition 
work that drives success or failure falls within the service components and not the DoD as 
a whole, this approach helps with consistency. Only five data points show a difference of 
more than 3 percent: In FY14 and FY15, DHS experienced a higher attrition rate within its 
                                                 
112 Adapted from “FedScope Employment Cubes,” Office of Personnel Management, accessed 
January 25, 2018, https://www.fedscope.opm.gov/employment.asp. 
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1102, contracting, series by 6 percent and 8 percent, respectively. The DoD experienced a 
greater loss of its operational research analysists in FY14 and FY15 than DHS by 4 percent 
each year. In FY17, the DoD lost 5 percent more of its information technology specialists 
from the 2210 series. 
The close correlation between the DoD and DHS data suggest both acquisition 
communities encounter the same challenges in retention of their professional workforce. 
In general, DHS attrition rates are lower in the job series reviewed; however, without 
further examination, it is not possible to determine why. Furthermore, the size of the two 
acquisition workforces is substantially different; DHS’s acquisition workforce  in 2017 was 
12,865, while DoD’s 2015 acquisition workforce had about 156,313 members.113  
In comparison, data from the Department of Labor Statistics presented in Table 12 
show that public service agencies—federal, state, and local, but excluding education—had 
some of the lowest attrition rates among various industries between FY13 and FY17. Mary 
Chapman asserts, “Some private-sector positions may offer higher starting salaries, but 
recruiters say government jobs often have better benefits and more opportunities for 
advancement. With corporation acquisition, buyouts and mergers out of the equation, there 
is more job security.”114 Benefits and job security are common themes attracting people 
to public service and certainly have an impact on lower attrition rates.  
                                                 
113 DHS Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, Human Capital Plan; DoD, Department of Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015). 
114 Mary Chapman, “You Can Work for the Federal Government,” Black Collegian 40, no. 1 
(September 2009): 8. 
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Table 12.   Attrition Rates of Various Industries115  
 
  
                                                 
115 Adapted from “Annual Total Separations Rates by Industry and Region, Not Seasonally 
Adjusted,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed March 16, 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
jolts.t16.htm. 
Industry 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total 38.1 40 41.8 42.2 43
INDUSTRY
Total private 42.3 44.5 46.2 46.5 47.4
Mining and logging 38.8 40.7 55.6 58.5 47.8
Construction 62.2 55.9 55.6 58 60.1
Manufacturing 23.1 24 25.5 27.2 30.4
Durable goods 21.9 21.7 24.2 25.7 27.2
Nondurable goods 25.1 27.8 27.7 29.7 35.7
Trade, transportation, and utilities 40.9 46.2 46.9 45.2 45
Wholesale trade 23.9 28.6 28.1 27.8 27.3
Retail trade 49 55.7 56.6 53.6 53
Transportation, warehousing, and 
utilities 35.9 37.8 39.1 39.8 41
Information 29.7 32.3 33.6 32.7 35
Financial activities 29.6 27.6 27.3 26.1 27.5
Finance and insurance 26.2 24.5 24.5 23.1 24.4
Real estate and rental and leasing 39.5 36.5 35.4 34.8 36.5
Professional and business services 56.7 60 61.5 63.9 64.1
Education and health services 29.2 29.7 30.8 31.3 32.3
Educational services 25.6 26 28.3 28.5 27.4
Health care and social assistance 29.9 30.3 31.3 31.8 33.2
Leisure and hospitality 64.1 68.7 73.2 74.5 73.8
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 73.7 81.5 79.5 80.1 82
Accommodation and food services 62.5 66.6 72.2 73.6 72.5
Other services 39.4 39.2 43.3 38.2 43.8
Government 16.1 16.1 17.9 18.5 18.3
Federal 15.9 14 16.5 16.4 16.7
State and local 16.1 16.5 18.1 18.8 18.5
State and local education 15.5 14.6 16.8 17.2 16.7
State and local, excluding education 16.8 18.6 19.7 20.5 20.6
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K. CYCLE TIME OF THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
Another consideration in the revolving door of the acquisition workforce at DHS is 
the cycle time associated with delivering capability to the end users. The longer it takes to 
deliver capability, the higher the risk of human capital turnover on a program. 
Table 13 shows that it takes DHS, on average, 4.9 years to deliver an initial 
capability to the user.116 The program’s baseline defines the initial operational capability 
(IOC) as the point at which the first group of end users is operating the new capability. 
Subsequently, the full operational capability (FOC) is when all intended users have 
received the capability and are operating it to support their mission. The average time for 
a program at DHS to declare FOC is 10.5 years. Table 13 demonstrates what the program’s 
turnover could possibly be. Without a doubt, in practice, a program would not necessarily 
lose people who have not just come on board, depleting the tacit knowledge; this example 
just presents a worst-case scenario.  
                                                 
116 GAO, DHS Has Strengthened Management; Earlier Requirements Definition. 
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Table 13.   Acquisition Cycle Times with Potential Program Turnover117 
 
 
David Tate from the Institute for Defense Analyses presented a paper at the 2016 
Acquisition Research Symposium entitled “Acquisition Cycle Time: Defining the 
Problem.” In the paper, he asserts that within the DoD there has been no major change in 
acquisition cycle times for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) in the last 25 
years.118 MDAPs are to the DoD what programs on the MAOL are to DHS: large 
acquisition programs. Figure 25 shows the time to achieve IOC for a number of acquisition 
programs within the DoD. 
                                                 
117 Adapted from GAO, DHS Has Strengthened Management. 
118 David M. Tate, “Acquisition Cycle Time: Defining the Problem,” Proceedings of the Thirteenth 











UH-60 10.3 14.5 0.41 0.58
MEA 1.7 9.3 0.07 0.37
NII  22.0 0.88
TACCOM 0.8 7.3 0.03 0.29
TECS Mod 3.8 6.6 0.15 0.26
FEMA LSCMS 3.4 9.3 0.08 0.27 0.75




PSP  6.4 0.39
TIM 2.5 10.3 0.15 0.62
FRC 4.0 17.6 0.32 1.41
H-65  11.1 0.89
HC-130H/J  17.8 1.43
HC-144A & C-27J 12.3 16.1 0.99 1.29
NSC  11.8 0.94
OPC 10.9 23.2 0.87 1.85
USCIS Transformation  7.7 0.04 0.31










Figure 25.  Program/Subprogram Cycle Time by IOC Year119 
Tate expands on two key findings from Figure 25: First, “Statistical analysis confirms 
that the trend is indistinguishable from zero, and that the median cycle time has been 
roughly eight years over that entire span.”120 Second, the median data hold true for all 
types of acquisition programs or commodity types, such as planes, sensor systems, tanks, 
and ships.121  
If Tate were able to establish the DoD cycle time to IOC as a consistent eight years 
over a 25-year period, DHS is currently doing well in comparison; data in the GAO’s 
annual DHS acquisition reports indicate an average IOC declaration at 4.9 years. The DHS 
data set in many circumstances only spans eight to 10 years since the department has 
formalized acquisition and started collecting data. The data still should be of interest to the 
acquisition community at DHS, as it provides historical information to inform new 
programs when establishing the initial program baseline. A 2006 GAO report proclaims, 
“A hallmark of an executable program is shorter development cycle times, which allow 
                                                 
119 Source: Tate, 74. 
120 Tate, 74. 
121 Tate, 75. 
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more systems to enter production more quickly.”122 Simply put, DHS should not expect 
programs to reach IOC in less than four years without significant schedule considerations 
and analysis of tasks to be completed. 
There are a number of workforce considerations when discussing cycle times and 
attrition rates across the department. First is the turnover of human capital within the 
component and, perhaps more importantly, at the program level, where capabilities are 
developed and transitioned to the user. For example, the ICE TECS Mod program has the 
possibility of turning over 26 percent of the program’s workforce prior to FOC, 5.9 years 
into the program’s life-cycle. The disruption of 26 percent of a program’s workforce is 
certain to create additional challenges for a program manager already overly taxed with the 
business of delivering a capability.  
Perhaps the greatest challenge, which is a challenge in itself to quantify, is the loss 
of tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge, according to Peter Busch, is “knowledge, not data or 
information, insofar as the term tends to be used to describe knowledge that is far more 
heavily based on personal understanding or experience.”123 Ashish Arora from Carnegie 
Mellon University, in an article published in the Journal of Development Economics, 
further describes tacit knowledge as “intangible knowledge, such as rules of thumb, 
heuristics, and other tricks of the trade.”124 The DHS acquisition process is well 
documented, with whos, whats and whens well defined in instructions, manuals, and 
guides. The “how” to get something done is a challenge, however, and comes only with 
experience for the acquisition professional. The years of experience transition into tacit 
knowledge for the acquisition professional—knowledge not documented or captured 
anywhere else. 
                                                 
122 Katherine V. Schinasi, DoD Acquisition Outcomes—A Case for Change, GAO-06-257T 
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2005), 6. 
123 Peter Busch, Tacit Knowledge in Organizational Learning (Hershey, PA: IGI Publishing, 2008), 3. 
124 Ashish Arora, “Contracting for Tacit Knowledge: The Provision of Technical Services in 
Technology Licensing Contracts,” Journal of Development Economics 50, no. 2 (August 1996): 233–56, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(96)00399-9. 
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L. TRANSFER RATE STUDY BY THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION 
INSTITUTE 
In 2017, the Federal Acquisition Institute conducted a study specifically focused on 
the 1102, contracting, job series. However, many of the issues the study addresses can 
apply across the entire acquisition community. Unfortunately for DHS, the study identifies 
the department as experiencing the greatest net loss of contracting professionals between 
FY10 and FY15, as shown in Table 14. 
Table 14.   1102 Job Series Agency Transfers: Largest Net Gains and Losses125 
 
 
The report does not specifically specify why DHS experienced a net loss of 253 
contracting professionals; however, it does outline a few factors that may have influenced 
personnel to leave. The two primary reasons a contracting professional left were for 
professional development or career advancement opportunities, and dissatisfaction with 
the agency’s leadership.126 Highlighted in Table 15 are the other primary and secondary 
reasons contracting professionals left. 
 
                                                 
125 Adapted from Federal Acquisition Institute, GS-1102 Workforce Mobility Study (Washington, DC: 
Federal Acquisition Institute, 2017), 9. 
126 Federal Acquisition Institute, 13. 
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Table 15.   Factors in Transferring127 
Most Important Factor 
Percent of 
Respondents 






Opportunities 27% Organizational Culture 15% 
Agency Leadership (not 
including Immediate 
Supervisor) 19% Compensation and Benefits 14% 
Compensation and Benefits 11% 
Immediate Supervisor/Team 
Lead 12% 
Work/Life Balance 10% 
Agency Leadership (not 
including Immediate 
Supervisor) 10% 
Organizational Culture 8% Personal Circumstances 10% 




Personal Circumstances 7% Organizational Culture 8% 
Immediate Supervisor/Team 
Lead 5% Workspace and Resources 5% 
Other 5% Nature of Work 4% 
 
M. WHAT OPENS THE DOOR? 
In his book The 7 Hidden Reasons Employees Leave, Leigh Branham identifies 19 
primary reasons employees leave an organization, based on data from 3,149 exit interviews 
between 1996 and 2003. Branham used exit interviews collected from 18 different 
organizations to generate the data in his study, further highlighted in Figure 26.128 
Consistent with the FAI study, Branham found that career growth or promotion potential 
is the primary reason an employee leaves a current position. Branham’s study dives into 
detail about why an employee may leave an organization, but he still asserts that 
dissatisfaction with leadership is a common reason. 
                                                 
127 Adapted from Federal Acquisition Institute, 13. 
128 Leigh Branham, The 7 Hidden Reasons Employees Leave (New York: American Management 
Association, 2005), 19. 
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Figure 26.  Why Employees Say They Leave129 
N. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the primary reasons why employees in job series supporting 
the acquisition community left between 2013 and 2017. Data showed how many employees 
left, why they left, and the number of component breaches in a given year, including trends. 
A comparison between similar DHS and DoD job series suggested that DHS attrition rates 
are slightly lower in the acquisition community. Data from the Department of Labor 
Statistics highlighted attrition rates within the federal acquisition workforce, showing that 
both DHS and DoD have lower rates than many industries. The impact of cycle time on 
attrition was also discussed, along with Tate’s cycle time study, which found that cycle 
times have not changed much over the years. Data from GAO reports, when consolidated, 
showed DHS’s average IOC to be 4.9 years, and its FOC to be 10.5 years. The FAI study 
conducted in 2017 showed movement data of the 1102 contracting workforce, discussing 
                                                 
129 Source: Branham, 21. 
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the primary reasons why those professionals change careers or at least agencies within the 
federal government. The FAI findings correlate with Branham’s work, which went into 
more detail about why employees leave an organization, with the leading cause being to 
seek career growth.  
The next chapter reviews what this attrition data means in regards to staffing of the 
acquisition workforce. A discussion of the required and actual staffing levels highlights 
potential concerns for acquisition programs that are working to mitigate the threat to the 
American homeland.  
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IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
Building on the data in the previous chapter, this chapter begins by discussing 
staffing gaps within acquisition programs at DHS to demonstrate the actual impact of 
attrition, and therefore instability. The chapter then discusses how long it takes to hire a 
new person into a federal government office, which shows the amount of time that attrition 
deprives an acquisition program of key staff members.  
A. STAFFING GAPS 
Within an acquisition program, attrition does not always have a negative impact; 
depending on where a program is in its life-cycle, natural attrition may be desirable. The 
negative impact is felt when a staff member leaves while the program is still in need of his 
or her particular skill set, which creates a staffing gap. This section discusses the actual 
staffing requirements of major acquisition programs at DHS and gaps identified by the 
GAO. 
DHS Instruction 102–01-006, entitled Acquisition Program Management Staffing, 
describes a critical acquisition position as follows: 
Critical acquisition program management positions are those in which the 
primary duties are supervision, leadership, or oversight performed by 
experienced acquisition program management personnel. These positions 
typically include inherently governmental duties/functions. Major program 
offices need critical acquisition program management positions to be 
staffed with personnel who have the proper qualifications, skills, and in-
depth experience in appropriate key acquisition disciplines based on the 
specific characteristics of the acquisition or program. These positions/
individuals are typically accountable to the Program Manager for successful 
execution of the functions and activities of a key acquisition discipline, and 
are central to ensuring DHS acquisition programs meet Department 
missions and are effectively managed.130 
 
                                                 
130 DHS, Acquisition Program Management Staffing, 5. 
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The GAO’s 2016 and 2017 annual reviews of major acquisition programs at DHS 
provided the data in Table 16, which compares DHS programs’ acquisition staffing 
requirements with the number of personnel actually on roll. This table provides evidence 
that the need for human capital changes throughout the acquisition life-cycle. For example, 
FEMA’s LSCMS program required an additional 1.5 personnel as it moved from FY16 
into FY17, the CDM program for the National Protection and Programs Directorate 
(NPPD) needed an additional 21, and TSA’s TIM program required an additional 16 
personnel. When compared to the number of losses and on-board personnel, the shortages 
for these programs are certainly not from attrition alone, but from true staffing needs. The 
greatest increase in staffing is with the USCG’s HC-144A and C27J programs, which 
required an additional 66 acquisition professionals. This table shows that DHS must 
approach staffing at a holistic level, accounting for personnel requirements and attrition; 
overall, the department was short 240 professionals in FY16 and 206 in FY17, closing the 
gap by only 34 people in a year. This data, however, cannot tell us the reason behind the 
remaining 206 acquisition professionals needed: Did the components hire more people to 
close the gap, only to have an equal number retire or depart for other reasons, causing the 
data to look as if the hiring process is not working adequately? 
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131 Adapted from GAO, DHS Has Strengthened Management; Earlier Requirements Definition. 
Need Gap Need Gap Critical Critical Vac
ACE 196 15 196 15 15 1
IFT 25 4 30 4 5 0
LBI 33.55 7.4 33.55 7.4 4 0
UH-60 16 3 5 0
MEA 16 3 5 0
NII 53.4 23.4 53.4 23.4 16 4
TACCOM 50.6 8.6 50.6 8.6 11 0
TECS Mod 38.35 2 38.35 2 8 0
FEMA LSCMS 23.5 8 25 3 19 1
ICE TECS Mod 20 0 20 0 11 0
CDM 30 14 51 20 19 1
HART 168 12 7 0
NCPS 168 71 176 36 7 0
NGN-PS 17.85 2.5 12 0 8 0
PSP 53 4 52 15 6 2
TIM 24 24 40 4.8 5 0
FRC 50 5 48 3 8 0
H-65 15 15 24.5 4 7 0
HC-130H/J 15 4 17 3 2 0
HC-144A & C-
27J
15 4 81 6 3 0
NSC 62 7 56 9 16 1
OPC 20 3 29 7 13 5
USCIS Transformation 102.5 18 132.34 17 50 1








As mentioned in Chapter III, the FY17 DHS workforce included 12,865 
professionals.132 This number becomes important as we consider planning for human 
capital. With the total workforce and the number of staffing shortages, the acquisition 
community is operating without roughly 1 percent of its needed workforce.133 The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics refers to this number as the organization’s vacancy rate. As shown in 
Figure 27, the DHS acquisition community’s vacancy rate is below the industry average, 
which in 2018 is 4 percent.134 
 
Figure 27.  Industry Annual Job Vacancy Rates135 
 
                                                 
132 DHS Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, Human Capital Plan, 4. 
133 This was calculated by taking the number of vacancies within the acquisition programs (206 in 
FY17) and dividing it by the total number of acquisition professionals in FY 7 (12,865), resulting in a 
vacancy rate of 1 percent. 
134 “Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed June 21, 2018, 
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/JTS00000000JOR. 
135 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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The staffing of both critical and non-critical acquisition positions supports the 
development of technologies needed by DHS operators who perform the department’s 
frontline mission. These positions are no less important to the homeland security mission 
than are the department’s frontline operators, such as border patrol, TSA, or immigration 
agents. While the vacancy rate is below the industry average, the media and the U.S. Senate 
have scrutinized the time it takes to hire a person to fill one of these vacant positions.136 
B. TIME-TO-HIRE CONSIDERATIONS 
The federal government’s hiring process is known for being cumbersome, 
complicated, and drawn out, as highlighted in a DHS report to Congress titled Strategy to 
Reduce the Time-to-Hire: 
The Committee is concerned with the length of time it takes to hire an 
employee at several DHS components. According to information from the 
Office of Personnel Management, the average number of days to hire an 
employee at DHS was 146 days in 2013, while the Government-wide 
average was 90 days. Certain areas of concern are with the Department’s 
law enforcement components such as CBP and the United States Secret 
Service where, on average, it takes 278 days and 327 days, respectively, to 
hire an employee. Non-law enforcement hires at the headquarters level take 
106 days on average and 198 days for senior executive employees. The 
President’s 2010 memorandum on improving the Federal Hiring and 
Recruitment process said, “Americans must be able to apply for Federal 
jobs through a commonsense hiring process and agencies must be able to 
select high-quality candidates efficiently and quickly.” Unless the 
Department improves upon its lengthy hiring process, the best and brightest 
candidates will more than likely choose other Federal agencies or opt for 
the private sector.137 
Figure 28 shows the average number of days it took DHS to hire a new employee 
in FY11 through FY14. These data consist of all job series and not only the acquisition 
community. Furthermore, the data presented is for positions that require a security 
investigation—something that most acquisition billets require. In FY14, it took 163 days 
on average to hire a new employee at DHS. The average time to hire in FY13 was 146 
                                                 
136 DHS Under Secretary for Management, Strategy to Reduce the Time-to-Hire (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 1. 
137 DHS Under Secretary for Management, 1.  
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days, and DHS had 19,645 employees, second to FY11, when DHS had 19,783 employees. 
This shows that several months pass before a new employee is brought onboard to replace 
an employee who decided to leave an acquisition billet. Another employee or couple of 
employees must absorb the workload of the missing employee during this time. The 
additional workload might contribute to burnout, which can potentially creating a domino 
effect from which a program can never recover. 
 
Figure 28.  DHS Time to Hire FY11–FY14138 
For those acquisition professionals already working within a DHS component, the 
time-to-hire data show how long they may need to perform the additional duties of vacant 
billets. Additionally, program managers must be aware of how long it takes to bring on a 
new employee so they can adequately cross-level the vacant billet’s workload. 
 
                                                 
138 Adapted from DHS Under Secretary for Management, 10. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
While the DHS acquisition workforce vacancy rate is low when compared to 
industry, there is concern about the time it takes to hire a person to fill a vacancy. 
Furthermore, a simple comparison of vacancy rates between industry and DHS tells a 
potential job seeker that his or her efforts may be better spent looking to industry for a job, 
especially if that job is needed in a hurry. This puts DHS at further risk of not hiring the 
best-qualified candidates.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
This conclusion answers the one primary research question and two sub-questions 
introduced in the first chapter: 
• Is there instability in the DHS acquisition workforce? 
• What is the attrition rate of the acquisition workforce at DHS? 
• What are the primary factors contributing to attrition of the acquisition 
workforce? 
To answer the primary question, the researcher collected and analyzed data and 
provided a definition for instability. For this study, instability was defined as any attrition 
data point for a job series that is above the component’s average attrition for a particular 
year. At the department level, with 270 data points available, 82—or 30 percent—of the 
data points were above the component’s annual attrition rate. While there is no standard or 
industry comparison to further define instability, the researcher feels the DHS acquisition 
workforce is stable based on the data available. However, DHS should take note and further 
investigate potential acquisition workforce instability in both CBP and ICE, for which 
60 percent of the data points fell above the component average, pointing to instability. 
To answer the first sub-question, the attrition rate of acquisition professionals at 
DHS was discussed in detail throughout Chapter III. Table 17 presents the components’ 
overall acquisition discipline attrition rates, averaged over the five-year study period (listed 
in from least to greatest). CBP and USCIS have the lowest attrition rates in the department, 
both at 4 percent. While CBP’s average attrition rate was low, the data, when reviewed in 
their entirety, still suggest some level of acquisition workforce instability, as previously 
mentioned. Headquarters, at 9 percent, and FEMA, at 8 percent, round off the top three 
highest attrition rates within the DHS acquisition system. ICE’s acquisition workforce 
attrition rate is the highest (10 percent) of all the components evaluated in this study. 
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The second sub question—about factors that contribute to attrition—was addressed 
in Chapters III and IV; Chapter III explained why personnel left based on DHS-collected 
data, and Chapter IV provided further investigation. The primary causes identified for all 
job series were resignation and voluntary retirement. 
Although an extensive research effort would be required to determine why attrition 
rates are higher in the acquisition community at DHS when compared to the components’ 
average, the researcher proposes two possible causes: burnout and experience taken 
elsewhere.  
1. Burnout 
First identified in the mid-1970s by psychologist Herbert Freudenberger, burnout 
is exhaustion of cognitive, emotional, and physical energy in support of an individual’s 
organizational goals.140 Research to date has focused on the impacts and leading causes of 
burnout at the individual level; however, the impact of individual burnout to the 
organizational mission has been overlooked. The idea of burnout being a contributing 
factor to higher-than-average attrition rates is suggested based on the average time to 
achieve IOC or FOC for acquisition programs at DHS. The constant grind of daily work to 
                                                 
139 Adapted from DHS Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, “On-Roll Job Series.” 
140 Robert Golembiewski, Handbook of Organizational Behavior, 2nd ed. (New York: Marcel 
Dekker, 2001), 327. 
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achieve success is all the more challenging when success criteria are not realized for almost 
five years. In Handbook of Organizational Behavior, Robert Golembiewski describes how 
employees’ “initial job expectations and actual job experiences partly determines 
employee’s reactions to their jobs, and there is some evidence to suggest that unmet job 
expectations are associated with burnout.”141 Perhaps an employee in the acquisition 
community at DHS sets personal expectations and career objectives based on a program’s 
milestone; when that milestone is delayed and additional work is required, burnout can set 
in, potentially leading to attrition.142 Golembiewski identifies seven consequences of 
burnout: attitude changes, job dissatisfaction, decreased organizational commitment, 
intention to quit, absence from work, poor job performance, and poor quality of personal 
life.143 To counter these effects, Golembiewski proposes a number of options: worksite 
changes, orientation changes, training, and finally individual-level interventions.144 
2. Experience Taken Elsewhere 
The training and certifications required of those in the DHS acquisition workforce 
ensure the department has people capable of delivering successful acquisition programs. 
Personnel who have senior-level certifications are marketable and highly desired in private 
industry. With the government unable to match private industry salaries, government 
acquisition professionals are often recruited by industry.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research effort identified a number of recommendations for DHS’s 
consideration. This section describes those recommendations in order of easiest to 
implement to hardest, with pros and cons or a brief discussion about the level of investment 
and return identified when appropriate. 
                                                 
141 Golembiewski, 343. 
142 Golembiewski, 343. 
143 Golembiewski, 346. 
144 Golembiewski, 350. 
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1. Acquisition Research 
DHS should consider forming an acquisition research team or program. An 
enormous amount of literature and data exist regarding acquisition, including that literature 
and data presented in this thesis. DHS should take advantage of existing resources to 
conduct research about its current acquisition challenges. An assessment, evaluation, and 
synthesis of existing information could raise the bar for the previously mentioned 
50-percent success rate of acquisition programs. 
Implementing such a program at DHS could be as simple as asking for volunteers 
who are interested in the cause, and seeking research topics from the components 
acquisition executives. Alternatively, the department could implement something more 
formal and structured. Since there is no direct mission need, a firm or restrictive schedule 
would not be required, and personnel would only conduct research as available. 
Alternatively, acquisition research projects could be included in an acquisition 
professional’s career development model, as discussed in the next sub-section. DHS could 
also consider granting a number of continuing education unites required for maintaining 
acquisition certification for the researcher’s efforts.  
The only potential downside of this recommendation is that it will create additional 
work for personnel or volunteers. However, establishing an acquisition research program 
within DHS requires minimal if any investment other than personnel time. The program 
could help identify changes to the acquisition system, which could result in increased 
program success and therefore a high return on investment. 
2. Acquisition Career Models 
DHS does maintain an acquisition certification program to ensure its professionals 
have the education, training, and experience needed to fill positions. DHS does not 
currently maintain a professional development framework for its acquisition professionals. 
Figure 29 shows the DoD career model for its test and evaluation acquisition professionals.  
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Figure 29.  DoD Test & Evaluation Career Model145 
There are advantages to developing career models for the DHS acquisition workforce, 
which include identifying training requirements throughout an acquisition professional’s 
career, identifying suggested assignments or positions, and finally identifying the critical 
competencies an acquisition professional should develop throughout his or her career. 
Similar to the first recommendation, the investment needed to develop a career model 
for the DHS acquisition workforce is minimal, with the driving resource being time. The 
return on investment is once again high; this work could reduce attrition rates, increase 
employee satisfaction, offer a more diverse or experienced workforce, and improve 
acquisition program outcomes. 
                                                 
145 Source: DoD, Acquisition Workforce Strategic Plan. 
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3. Exit Interviews 
As the data in Chapter III showed, DHS is able to capture the primary reason a 
person leaves the department. Conducting further questioning, either through an exit 
interview or a survey, would allow DHS to categorize why people are leaving. 
Understanding why a person is resigning is one broad way to understand workforce 
attrition; knowing the specific reason—if the person is able to be honest about it—creates 
greater fidelity. This would allow management to take corrective action if needed, 
potentially resulting in lower attrition rates within the acquisition workforce. 
To develop, conduct, and create a data repository for this recommendation, the key 
resource needed is, again, time. Human capital professionals certainly have access to 
existing exit interview templates, which can be customized for DHS, so this aspect of 
implementation is minimal. Time is the real challenge in making exit interviews more 
comprehensive. Moreover, departing employees are unlikely to be willing to sit down and 
discuss the specifics of their individual reasons for departing. Finally, DHS employees 
would need to create a repository to retain the data for future analysis. The preferred system 
would be a simple addition to an existing human capital database, which can be easily 
queried for data as needed. The return on investment for this recommendation may be the 
lowest of all recommendations, but it could help management make changes that result in 
decreased attrition rates.  
4. Data-Driven Management and Policy 
Data-driven management implies the use of all data sources to make management 
decisions. The acquisition workforce studied in this effort generates a significant amount 
of data. Using all the data to generate trends and predictive analysis lends itself to the 
potential to improve acquisition program outcomes. In the case of instability in the 
acquisition workforce, if DHS knows that after a breach in an acquisition program there is 
an increase in the number of personnel losses, management can plan accordingly when 
trying to overcome the breach.  
How policy is developed and what data is used to justify or drive policy should be 
investigated within DHS. For example, with an average IOC declaration of 4.9 years, the 
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department should reevaluate the guidance published in DHS Instruction 102–01-006, 
Acquisition Program Management Staffing, which “recommends program managers serve 
a minimum of four years, or until the next ADE.”146 This example raises two questions. 
First, Why did DHS determine that four years was appropriate for this recommendation? 
Based on the data in this study, five years may be a more appropriate time. Second, What 
is the likelihood that any one program manager is going to serve a consecutive five-year 
assignment in the same position? Both of these questions exemplify how data should be 
used to drive policy.  
This recommendation comes with a slightly higher level of time investment needed 
to collect or gather data, analyze it, and finally present it in a fashion that will drive policy 
decisions. The return on investment for this recommendation is subjective. A deeper 
understanding of policy evaluation would be required to fully research its benefits. 
5. Color the Workforce Purple 
Chapter IV identified that DHS is short 206 acquisition professionals as of FY17. 
Past research conducted by Lieutenant Colonel John Lyle, while he was attending the Air 
War College, suggests consolidating the acquisition workforce at the DoD.147 
Furthermore, Lyle discovered that, of the 63 countries represented in the 1999 Air War 
College class of international students, the majority maintained a consolidated acquisition 
organization.148 When Lyle asked the students why their countries consolidated 
acquisition offices, the answer was, “Our country cannot afford separate acquisition 
commands in each service.”149 For DHS, this would translate into the consolidation of 
each or some of the components’ acquisition functions within the department. Furthermore, 
                                                 
146 DHS, Acquisition Program Management Staffing. 
147 John M. Lyle, “Department of Defense Acquisition Workforce: Color Me Purple?” (thesis, Air 
War College Maxwell AFB, 1999), 3. 
148 Lyle, 34. 
149 Lyle, 34. 
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Lyle’s work identifies a potential cost savings of almost 20 percent with consolidation of 
the United Kingdom’s acquisition workforce.150  
In 1998, the Defense Science Board released a report about acquisition 
organizations and suggested creating an acquisition workforce manned by an increased 
number of generalists who have a larger knowledge and experience base than just one part 
of the acquisition process.151 A consolidation would have both near-term and long-term 
benefits.  
Whether DHS considers a mass consolidation or a division of labor by commodity, 
greater efficiencies would result. A commodity consolidation would follow a DoD 
approach in which program executive offices manage acquisitions by type of commodity. 
The commodities developed by DHS include ships, aircraft (fixed and rotary winged), 
information technology, and a combined group of detection and sensor technologies. 
Another advantage to consolidation would be the potential cost savings of maintaining 
several separate physical acquisition shops across the department. All of DHS’s component 
acquisition offices are physically located in various offices across the Washington, DC, 
metro area, which ranks 6th in the nation for the most expensive office space.152 
That said, according to Lyle, the components are likely to oppose implementing 
this “purple workforce” due to the enormous size of the DoD acquisition community. The 
same reservation may not hold true for DHS’s acquisition workforce, as it is much smaller, 
and may therefore experience an easier transition process. Perhaps the greatest challenge 
for DHS would be funding. DHS is funded by a number of appropriations, which would 
make consolidation complicated. Ideally, for DHS, the appropriations would also be 
merged.  
                                                 
150 Lyle, 35. 
151 Lyle, 12. 
152 Jeff Clabaugh, “DC Ranks No. 6 for U.S. Office Rents,” WTOP, January 29, 2018, 
https://wtop.com/business-finance/2018/01/dc-ranks-no-6-us-office-rents/. 
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This section presents topics for future investigation, all with the intent to improve 
acquisition outcomes within DHS. 
First, when the Office of the Chief Human Capital is able to identify personnel 
directly supporting acquisition programs, this study itself should be redone. Repeating this 
study with actual acquisition workforce numbers may yield different results than 
accounting for the entire job series. While this research speculates the results will be 
similar, the confirmation itself would be a worthwhile effort. 
Future research should also explore the impact of the acquisition workforce attrition 
and staffing shortages on program effectiveness. For example, does a program that has high 
employee turnover cost more, take longer to deliver a capability, or experience a higher 
risk of breach? 
Another potential research opportunity lies in the quality and resulting effectiveness 
of DHS’s acquisition workforce certification program. Three factors drive acquisition 
certification requirements at DHS: experience, education, and training. Research should 
explore whether or not the department is evaluating an individual’s experience adequately 
before that person receives a certification, and whether or not the current number of years 
of experience is adequate. Currently, only two certifications maintain a formal education 
requirement, for the systems engineering and contracting disciplines. Research should also 
determine if the training provided—including its content—effectively leads to 
certification, or if the material is inappropriate or has gaps.  
Finally, DHS should conduct research to determine if acquisition employees are 
experiencing burnout. For example, How much of a program manager’s time is spent in 
support of request for information from oversight bodies within the department? Or, How 
long does it take a program to write one of the many acquisition documents required within 
the acquisition life-cycle? Research of this nature will reveal trends and needs, driving 
process innovation or potentially acquisition reform within the department.  
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